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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For over thirty years, lawyers have argued that involuntarily committed 
psychiatric patients have a right to refuse treatment (basing this argument, 
variously, on the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth 
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Amendments, as well as on state common law and constitutional law).1  
For the same period of time, this has been the most contentious issue in 
the “turf” battle between what is incorrectly characterized as “law and 
psychiatry,”2 and is seen as the “pivotal issue in the determination of the 
future direction of the relationship between law and mental health,”3 or 
“the most important subject matter under consideration in the area of the 
legal regulation of mental health practice.”4
At this point, legally, there can be little question that the ball game is 
over.  The Supreme Court’s decisions in Washington v. Harper,5  Riggins v. 
Nevada,6 and, most recently, Sell v. United States,7 make it clear that: a 
qualified right to refuse medication is located in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause; the pervasiveness of side effects is a key factor in 
the determination of the scope of the right; the state bears a considerable 
burden in medicating a patient over objection, and the “least restrictive 
alternative” mode of analysis must be applied to right to refuse cases.8  
Nonetheless, the controversy over the right continues unabated.9
During this same thirty years, scholars have carefully considered 
the right to refuse from a rich array of perspectives, including, but 
not limited to, clinical perspectives, civil libertarian perspectives, 
philosophical perspectives, and political perspectives.10  Yet, virtually 
all of this—remarkably—passes over what I believe is the single most 
important issue in “real life.”  This issue is the most relevant to the actual 
(as opposed to paper) existence of the right and the actual (as opposed to 
paper) implementation of that right: the availability and adequacy of 
counsel to represent patients seeking to assert this right to refuse.  In spite 
of the extensive literature and caselaw that has developed in this area of the 
law, the topic remains egregiously underdiscussed and underlitigated. 
 1.  See generally 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL ch. 3B (2d ed. 1999). 
 2.  It is, rather, between lawyers representing patients and lawyers representing 
state hospital systems. 
 3.  Michael L. Perlin, The Right to Refuse Treatment: A New Right Emerges, 1 
ADVOC. NOW: J. PATIENT RTS. & MENTAL HEALTH ADVOC. 8, 8 (1979). 
 4.  Michael L. Perlin, Reading the Supreme Court’s Tea Leaves: Predicting 
Judicial Behavior in Civil and Criminal Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 12 AM. J. 
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 37, 40 (1991). 
 5.  494 U.S. 210 (1990) (discussing the right to refuse treatment in prisons). 
 6.  504 U.S. 127 (1992) (discussing the right to refuse treatment at insanity defense trial). 
 7.  539 U.S. 166 (2003) (discussing the right to refuse treatment in determination 
of defendant’s competency to stand trial). 
 8.  See, e.g., id. at 177–83. 
 9.  See, e.g., William M. Brooks, Reevaluating Substantive Due Process as a 
Source of Protection for Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Drugs, 31 IND. L. REV. 937, 937–38 
(1998). 
 10.  See 2 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 3B-2, at 165–67 nn. 24–33 (citing sources). 
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Simply put, if active, trained counsel is not provided for patients seeking 
to interpose this right, then the right becomes nothing more than a paper 
document: useless and meaningless (and perhaps, counterproductive) in 
the “real world.”  Anyone with more than a passing interest in mental 
disability law is familiar with the concept of the “paper victory,” and 
how such “victories” are one of the shameful pretexts in this area of the 
law.11
In this Paper, I will discuss: (1) the generally mediocre job done by 
lawyers in the involuntary civil commitment process, (2) more particularly, 
the equally mediocre job done in the right to refuse treatment process, 
especially where both courts and legislatures have failed to articulate a 
universal right to counsel in right to refuse cases, (3) the reasons why 
counsel is so critical in such cases, (4) the significance of what I call 
“sanism” and what I call “pretextuality,” and the application of a “therapeutic 
jurisprudence” mode of analysis to the topic in trying to understand all 
of this, and (5) my recommendations for the future. 
My title comes from Bob Dylan’s early song, Just Like Tom Thumb’s 
Blues.  In this couplet, he shares with the listener his sense of frustration 
and confusion with his place in the world: 
Now if you see Saint Annie 
Please tell her thanks a lot 
I cannot move 
My fingers are all in a knot 
I don’t have the strength 
To get up and take another shot 
And my best friend, my doctor 
Won’t even say what it is I’ve got12
One of the reasons why the right to counsel is so critical in right to 
refuse cases is that it may be the only way of ensuring that the patient’s 
doctor (the “best friend” descriptor is ironic in these circumstances) 
actually does tell the patient “what it is [he’s] got.”  That would be a step 
in the right direction. 
 11.  See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “Life Is in Mirrors, Death Disappears”: Giving 
Life to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 315, 315 (2003); Michael L. Perlin, “Their Promises of 
Paradise”: Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the Constitutional “Least Restrictive 
Alternative” Principle in Mental Disability Law?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 999, 1049 (2000).  
See generally Michael S. Lottman, Paper Victories and Hard Realities, in PAPER 
VICTORIES AND HARD REALITIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 93 (Valerie Bradley & Gary 
Clarke eds., 1976). 
 12.  BOB DYLAN, Just Like Tom Thumb’s Blues, on HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED (1965). 




II.  COUNSEL IN THE CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS13
The assumption that individuals facing involuntary civil commitment 
are globally represented by adequate counsel is an assumption of a fact 
not in evidence.14  The data suggests that, in many jurisdictions, such 
counsel is woefully inadequate—disinterested, uninformed, roleless, and 
often hostile.15  A model of “paternalism/best interests” is substituted for 
a traditional legal advocacy position, and this substitution is rarely 
questioned.16  Few courts have ever grappled with adequacy of counsel 
questions in this context; fewer yet have found assigned involuntary civil 
commitment to be inadequate.17
Only the Supreme Court of Montana has ever adopted meaningful and 
complex performance standards for counsel in such cases.18  In In re the 
Mental Health of K.G.F.,19 that court dramatically launched a rewriting 
of this area of the law.  K.G.F. was a voluntary patient at a community 
hospital in Montana, whose expressed desire to leave the facility 
prompted a state petition alleging her need for commitment.  Counsel 
was appointed, and a commitment hearing was scheduled for the next 
day.  The state’s expert recommended commitment, and the patient’s 
counsel presented the testimony of both the plaintiff herself and a mental 
health professional, who recommended that the patient be kept in the 
hospital a few days so that a community-based treatment plan could be 
arranged nearer to her home.  The court ordered commitment, and 
K.G.F.’s appeal was premised, in part, on allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.20
In a thoughtful and scholarly opinion, the Montana Supreme Court 
relied on state statutory and constitutional sources to find that “the right 
to counsel . . . provides an individual subject to an involuntary commitment 
proceeding the right to effective assistance of counsel.  In turn, this right 
affords the individual with the right to raise the allegation of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in challenging a commitment order.”21  In assessing 
what constitutes “effectiveness,” the court—startlingly, to my mind—eschewed 
 13. See generally 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 2B-11; MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE 
HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 146–49 (2000). 
 14.  Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of 
Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 39 (1992). 
 15.  Id. at 43. 
 16.  Id. at 43–44. 
 17.  See generally Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: 
Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 686–90 (2003). 
 18.  The text, infra, accompanying notes 19–45 is largely adapted from Perlin, 
supra note 17, at 691–94. 
 19.  29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001). 
 20.  Id. at 488–89. 
 21.  Id. at 491. 
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the Strickland v. Washington standard22 (used to assess effectiveness in 
criminal cases) as insufficiently protective of the “liberty interests of 
individuals such as K.G.F., who may or may not have broken any law, 
but who, upon the expiration of a 90-day commitment, must indefinitely 
bear the badge of inferiority of a once ‘involuntarily committed’ person 
with a proven mental disorder.”23  Interestingly, one of the key reasons 
why Strickland was seen as lacking was the court’s conclusion that 
“reasonable professional assistance”24—the linchpin of the Strickland 
decision—“cannot be presumed in a proceeding that routinely accepts—and 
even requires—an unreasonably low standard of legal assistance and 
generally disdains zealous, adversarial confrontation.”25
In assessing the contours of effective assistance of counsel, the court 
emphasized that it was not limiting its inquiry to courtroom performance.  
Even more important was counsel’s “failure to fully investigate and 
comprehend a patient’s circumstances prior to an involuntary civil 
commitment hearing or trial, which may, in turn, lead to critical 
decision-making between counsel and client as to how best to 
proceed.”26  Such prehearing matters, the court continued, “clearly 
involve effective preparation prior to a hearing or trial.”27  The court 
further stressed state laws guaranteeing the patient’s “dignity and 
personal integrity” and “privacy and dignity”28 as a basis for its decision: 
“‘[q]uality counsel provides the most likely way—perhaps the only 
likely way’ to ensure the due process protection of dignity and privacy 
interests in cases such as the one at bar.”29
After noting that the focus of its condemnation was not assigned 
counsel in the case before it, (but rather “the failure of the system as a 
whole, one that through the ordinary course of the efficient administration 
of a legal process threatens to supplant an individual’s due process 
rights”),30 the court again focused on the issue of dignity, quoting an 
 22.  466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing a weak effectiveness of counsel standard).  
See generally 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 2B-11.2 (criticizing Strickland standard). 
 23.  K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 491. 
 24.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 25. K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 492 (citing Perlin, supra note 14, at 53–54 & n.84 
(identifying Strickland standard as “sterile and perfunctory” where “reasonably effective 
assistance” is objectively measured by the “prevailing professional norms”)). 
 26.  K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 492. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 493 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-21-101(1), 53-21-142(1) (1979)). 
 29.  Id. at 494 (citing Perlin, supra note 14, at 47). 
 30.  Id. 




article by Professor Bruce Winick: “‘Perhaps nothing can threaten a 
person’s belief that he or she is an equal member of society as much as 
being subjected to a civil commitment hearing’ and when ‘legal 
proceedings do not treat people with dignity, they feel devalued as 
members of society.’”31
The court continued by considering the issues of prejudice, stereotyping, 
and stigma,32 and specifically held that even pejorative language—the 
court here quoted a 1977 state supreme court case that had referred to 
persons with disabilities as “idiots and lunatics”33—was “repugnant to 
our state constitution.”34  Having set out this legal framework, the court 
observed that state statutes offered “little assistance” in determining the 
scope of “effective counsel,” and thus sought to give depth to the terse 
statutory language.35
“At a bare minimum,” the court observed, “counsel should possess a 
verifiably competent understanding of the legal process of involuntary 
commitments, as well as the range of alternative, less-restrictive treatment 
and care options available.”36  In the initial investigation, counsel must: 
conduct a thorough review of all available records . . . necessarily involv[ing] 
the patient’s prior medical history and treatment, if and to what extent medication 
has played a role in the petition for commitment, the patient’s relationship to 
family and friends within the community, and the patient’s relationship with all 
relevant medical professionals involved prior to and during the petition process.37
Also, counsel should be prepared to discuss with his or her client “the 
available options in light of such investigations,” as well as the “practical 
and legal consequences of those options.”38  It is “imperative,” the court 
stressed, “that counsel request a reasonable amount of time for such an 
investigation prior to the hearing or trial on the petition.”39  Moreover, 
counsel “should also attempt to interview all persons who have knowledge 
of the circumstances surrounding the commitment petition, including 
family members, acquaintances and any other persons identified by the 
client as having relevant information, and be prepared to call such 
 31.  Id. at 495 (quoting Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil 
Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 44–45 (1999)). 
 32.  Id. at 495–96 (citing Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism”, 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 
374 (1992)); Winick, supra note 31, at 45). 
 33.  Id. at 495 (quoting In re Sonsteng, 573 P.2d 1149, 1153 (Mont. 1977)). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 497. 
 36.  Id. at 498. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. (quoting National Center for State Courts’ Guidelines for Involuntary Civil 
Commitment, 10 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP., 409, 465 pt. E2 (1986) 
[hereinafter Guidelines]). 
 39.  Id. 
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After similarly elaborating on counsel’s role in the client interview 
and the need to insure that the patient understands the scope of the 
right to remain silent, the court concluded by underscoring counsel’s 
responsibilities “as an advocate and adversary.”41  The lawyer must 
“represent the perspective of the [patient] and . . . serve as a vigorous 
advocate for the [patient’s] wishes,” engaging in “all aspects of 
advocacy and vigorously argu[ing] to the best of his or her ability for the 
ends desired by the client,” and operating on the “presumption that a 
client wishes to not be involuntarily committed.”42  Thus, “evidence that 
counsel independently advocated or otherwise acquiesced to an involuntary 
commitment—in the absence of any evidence of a voluntary and knowing 
consent by the patient-respondent—will establish the presumption that 
counsel was ineffective.”43  In conclusion, the court stated: 
[I]t is not only counsel for the patient-respondent, but also courts, that are 
charged with the duty of safeguarding the due process rights of individuals 
involved at every stage of the proceedings, and must therefore rigorously 
adhere to the standards expressed herein, as well as those mandated under 
[state statute].44
Although K.G.F. provides an easily transferable blueprint for courts 
that want to grapple with adequacy of counsel issues in this context, but 
are reluctant to explore totally uncharted waters,45 the decision remains 
the exception to the usual practice.  K.G.F. has only been cited once 
outside of Montana, and in that case, the Washington Court of Appeals 
took issue with the K.G.F. court’s rejection of the Strickland standard.46  
But globally, counsel’s continuing failure here still appears to be 
inevitable, given the bar’s abject disregard of both consumer groups 
(made up predominantly of former recipients, both voluntary and 
 40.  Id. at 498–99. 
 41.  Id. at 500. 
 42.  Id. (quoting Guidelines, supra note 38, at 465 pt. E2; id. at 483 pt. F5). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 501. 
 45.  See, e.g., In re A.S., 87 P.3d 408, 413 (Mont. 2004) (relying in part on K.G.F. 
to find that parents have a due process right to effective assistance of counsel in 
proceedings to terminate parental rights). 
 46. In re Detention of T.A. H.-L., 97 P.3d 767, 771–72 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) 
(“We do not share the Montana Supreme Court’s dim view of the quality of civil 
commitment proceedings, or their adversarial nature, in the state of Washington.  The 
Strickland standard appears to be sufficient to protect the right to the effective assistance 
of counsel for a civil commitment respondent in this state.”). 




involuntary, of mental disability services) and individuals with mental 
disabilities, many of whom have written carefully, thoughtfully, and 
sensitively about these issues.47  This inadequacy further reflects sanist 
practices—and I will soon elaborate on what this means—on the part of 
the lawyers representing persons with mental disabilities, as well as the 
political entities vested with the authority to hire such counsel.  
Although a handful of articulate scholars take this question seriously,48 
the questions raised here do not appear to be a priority agenda item for 
litigators or for most academics writing in this area. 
The issue was addressed over twenty years ago, however, in an article 
by John Ensminger and Thomas Liguori,49 in which the authors looked 
carefully at the way that the commitment process actually works, the 
effect it has on the individuals subject to commitment, and how state 
hospital employees respond to the litigational process.50  In arguing that 
the civil commitment process had great therapeutic potential, the authors 
stressed that such hearings are therapeutic because, inter alia, they give 
patients an opportunity to present and hear evidence in a meaningful 
court procedure.51  Writing about this topic some nine years ago, I 
speculated that “[t]hese same benefits can be attributed to medication 
hearings, particularly as these hearings are, in some jurisdictions, more 
 47.  On the involvement of consumer groups in important patients’ rights 
litigation, see 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, §1-2.1, at 10 n.43; Michael L. Perlin, “Things 
Have Changed:” Looking at Non-Institutional Mental Disability Law Through the 
Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 540 (2003).  See generally Challenging the 
Therapeutic State: Critical Perspectives on Psychiatry and the Mental Health System, 11 
J. MIND & BEHAV. 1–328 (David Cohen ed., 1990) (symposium issue). 
 48.  See, e.g., Joshua Cook, Good Lawyering and Bad Role Models: The Role of 
Respondent’s Counsel in a Civil Commitment Hearing, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 179 
(2000); Stanley S. Herr, The Future of Advocacy for Persons with Mental Disabilities, 39 
RUTGERS L. REV. 443 (1987); Stanley S. Herr, Representation of Clients with 
Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and Control, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 609 (1989–
1990); Peter Margulies, “Who Are You To Tell Me That?”: Attorney-Client Deliberation 
Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 213 (1990); 
Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the 
Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515; Steven J. Schwartz, Damage 
Actions as a Strategy for Enhancing the Quality of Care of Persons with Mental 
Disabilities, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 651 (1989–1990); Christopher Slobogin 
& Amy Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Fiduciary Duty to Clients with 
Mental Disability, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1581 (2000). 
 49.  John J. Ensminger & Thomas D. Liguori, The Therapeutic Significance of the 
Civil Commitment Hearing: An Unexplored Potential, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1978), 
reprinted in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 245 
(David B. Wexler ed., 1990) [hereinafter THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE]. 
 50.  I discuss the significance of the Ensminger/Liguori article in Michael L. 
Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 414–15 (2000). 
 51.  Ensminger & Liguori, supra note 49, as reprinted in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, 
supra note 49, at 249–53. 
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formal than commitment hearings.”52  Not one thing has happened in the 
intervening years to remotely change my mind. 
It is to this question that I now wish to turn. 
III.  COUNSEL IN RIGHT TO REFUSE CASES53
There is scant literature that addresses the question of the availability 
and adequacy of counsel in right to refuse medication hearings.54  This 
near-total lack of attention is even more striking when juxtaposed with 
the extensive scholarship that has developed discussing the law reform/test 
case litigation that led directly to the judicial articulation of a right to 
refuse treatment.55
Lawyers representing individuals with mental disabilities must familiarize 
themselves with information about the right to refuse treatment, both as 
to the law and as to the pharmacology.56 The track record of lawyers 
representing persons with mental disabilities has ranged from indifferent 
to wretched;57 in one famous survey, lawyers were so bad that a patient 
had a better chance of being released at a commitment hearing if he 
appeared pro se.58  Further, simply educating lawyers about psychiatric 
 52.  Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1 
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 80, 114 (1995). 
 53.  This section is largely adapted from Michael L. Perlin, “Salvation” or a 
“Lethal Dose”? Attitudes and Advocacy in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 4 J. 
FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. No. 4, at 51 (2004). 
 54.  See Melvin R. Shaw, Professional Responsibility of Attorneys Representing 
Institutionalized Mental Patients in Relation to Psychotropic Medication, 22 J. HEALTH 
& HOSP. L. 186, 192 (1989) (characterizing lawyers’ arguments seeking to vindicate a 
right to refuse medication as an “injustice”). 
 55.  For recent literature, see, for example, 2 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 3B-1, at 155 
n.1, and § 3B-2, at 157 n.2. 
 56.  See generally Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than 
“Dodging Lions and Wastin’ Time?” Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, 
and the Judicial Process in Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL., 
PUB. POL’Y, & L. 114, 135–36 (1996). 
 57. See Perlin, supra note 14, at 43–45; see also, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 48, at 
662 (describing the “wholesale lack of legal advocacy” available to patients in public 
mental institutions). 
 58. Elliott Andalman & David L. Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing 
Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 MISS. L.J. 43, 72 (1974).  
One-half of the lawyers assigned to represent individuals in civil commitment cases in 
Dallas were unaware of the existence of either of the two treatises written specifically 
about Texas’s mental health law. Daniel W. Shuman & Richard Hawkins, The Use of 
Alternatives to Institutionalization of the Mentally Ill, 33 SW. L.J. 1181, 1193–94 (1980) 
(noting that attorneys received $25 per case). 




technique and psychological nomenclature does not materially improve 
lawyers’ performance where underlying attitudes are not changed. 59  If 
counsel is to become even minimally competent in this area, it is critical 
that the underlying issues here be confronted. 60  This is underscored by 
judges’ lack of basic knowledge about mental disability law; in one 
astonishing case, a Louisiana civil commitment order was reversed 
where the trial court did not even know of the existence of a state-
mandated Mental Health Advocacy Service. 61  If lawyers continue to so 
abdicate their advocacy role, it is not surprising that so many areas of 
application of the right to refuse treatment remain judicially unexplored. 
Like other legal rights, the right to refuse treatment is not self-
executing.62  A statement by a state supreme court or a federal court of 
appeals that a patient has a “qualified right to refuse treatment” does not, 
in and of itself, automatically translate into a coherent structure through 
which hearings are scheduled, counsel is appointed, and hearing procedures 
are established.  Of the important right to refuse cases, only Rivers v. Katz 
establishes any mechanism for the appointment of counsel in individual 
right to refuse cases. 63  Although Rennie v. Klein—one of the first federal 
cases to find a substantive constitutional right to refuse—originally 
 59. Norman G. Poythress Jr., Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training 
Attorneys to Cope with Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 15 (1978); see also 
Perlin, supra note 17, at 690.  There is similar evidence in other areas of the law that 
knowledge alone is an insufficient impetus for attitudinal change.  See, e.g., Robert M. 
Bohm et al., Knowledge and Death Penalty Opinion: A Test of the Marshall Hypotheses, 
28 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 360 (1991). 
 60. For a rare judicial acknowledgment of the impact of lawyer incompetency in 
another area where inadequate counsel leads to morally intolerable results, see Engberg 
v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 104 (Wyo. 1991) (Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part): “We . . . let ‘chiropractors’ with law degrees perform the equivalent 
of brain surgery in capital cases and, predictably, the ‘patient’ often dies.  This is 
intolerable.” 
 61. See, e.g., In re Judicial Commitment of C.P.K., 516 So. 2d 1323, 1325 (La. Ct. 
App. 1987) (reversing commitment order where trial court failed to comply with statute 
expressing explicit preference for representation by state Mental Health Advocacy 
Service, and rejecting as “untenable” argument that trial court should be excused “since 
it did not know . . . whether the Service really existed”).  I discuss C.P.K. in this context 
in Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 56, at 120 n.67. 
 62. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA 
L. REV. 921, 941 (1985); see also Alan H. Macurdy, The Americans With Disabilities 
Act: Time for Celebration, or Time for Caution?, 1 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 21, 29 (1991); 
John Parry, Rights Aplenty But Not Enough Money: A Paradox in Federal Disability 
Policies, 12 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 486 (1988) (pointing out that while 
there has been legislation to enhance the civil rights of persons with disabilities, the laws 
are not always fully implemented due to the lack of funding and other resources). 
 63. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343–44 (N.Y. 1986).  Representation in Rivers 
hearings is provided by the state-funded Mental Hygiene Legal Services (MHLS) office.  
In re St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 607 N.Y.S.2d 574, 579 n.11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993), 
aff’d, 675 N.E.2d 1209 (N.Y. 1996). 
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mandated the appointment of counsel,64 it later receded from this position 
and required only the presence of “Patient Advocates” (employees of the 
state Division of Mental Health and Hospitals) to serve as “informal 
counsel to patients who wish to refuse [antipsychotic medication]”).65
A handful of statutes mandate the appointment of counsel in right to 
refuse treatment hearings;66 however, at least one court has held that 
failure to appoint counsel is not reversible error,67 and only a few cases 
have spoken to the role or scope of counsel at medication hearings.68 
Although more courts are beginning to articulate the criteria to be considered 
at a medication refusal hearing,69 this level of specificity is simply not 
present in the assessment of the role and responsibilities of counsel.70 
Without such an articulation of specificity, the authentic meaning of a 
“right to refuse” remains murky.  A right without a remedy is no right at 
all;71 worse, a right without a remedy is meretricious and pretextual—it 
 64. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1147 (D.N.J. 1978), suppl., 476 F. Supp. 
1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 
(1982). 
 65. Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1311; see also id. at 1313 (“[Patient Advocates] may 
be trained attorneys, psychologists, social workers, registered nurses or paralegals, “or 
have any equivalent experience.”).  This recession followed the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), allowing for relaxed procedures in the 
cases of the involuntary civil commitment of juveniles.  But see United States v. 
Humphreys, 148 F. Supp. 2d 949 (D.S.D. 2001) (holding that lay advocate, who was 
supposed to appear on defendant’s behalf at involuntary medication hearing, but who 
actually testified against him, did not meet requirements of due process). 
 66. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. 43A § 5-415(A)(1) (West Supp. 2005); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 880.33(2)(a)(1) (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-1-4, 43-1-15 (Michie 
2000); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-107.1(a)(3) (West 1997 & Supp. 2004); see also 
In re Jones, 743 N.E.2d 1090, 1094 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that trial court 
committed reversible error in appointing guardian ad litem to represent individual in 
medication hearing, as he had a statutory right to an attorney). 
 67. In re Steen, 437 N.W.2d 101, 105 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).  Steen, interestingly, 
has only been cited by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in the fourteen years since it was 
decided.  Cf. Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that the right 
to legal assistance extends only through pleading stage of habeas or civil rights action). 
 68. See, e.g., Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1313 (“[Patient Advocates] must be given 
training in the effects of psychotropic medication and the principles of legal advocacy.”); 
In re Jarvis, 433 N.W.2d 120, 123–24 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (criticizing failure to give 
counsel adequate time to explore basis for treating psychiatrist’s choice of medications); 
Williams v. Wilzack, 573 A.2d 809, 821 (Md. 1990) (criticizing failure to give counsel 
opportunity to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses). 
 69. See, e.g., Virgil D. v. Rock County, 524 N.W.2d 894, 899–900 (Wis. 1994). 
 70. See Perlin, supra note 14, at 56 & n.101 (asserting that as mental disability law 
becomes more complex, it is essential that counsel for patients understand differing right 
to refuse treatment doctrines and their rationales). 
 71. Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the 




gives the illusion of a right without any legitimate expectation that the 
right will be honored. 72  This is especially significant in light of Professor 
Tom Tyler’s research in procedural justice finding that individuals 
subject to involuntary civil commitment hearings, like all other citizens, 
are affected by such process values as participation, dignity, and trust, 
and that experiencing arbitrariness in procedure leads to “social malaise 
and decreases people’s willingness to be integrated into the polity, 
accepting its authorities and following its rules.”73  Also, subsequent 
research by Dr. Hoge and Professor Feucht-Haviar provides further 
empirical support for Professor Tyler’s insights.  Their study of long-
term psychiatric patients found, in an informed consent context, that 
“capable patient involvement is an important check on a physician’s 
judgment.” 74
“Empirical surveys consistently demonstrate that the quality of 
counsel ‘remains the single most important factor in the disposition of  
involuntary civil commitment cases.’”75  Certainly the presence of adequate 
counsel is of critical importance in the disposition of right to refuse 
treatment cases as well.  Furthermore, the research makes clear that 
jurisdictions are wildly inconsistent in the implementation of the right to 
refuse laws in general, especially with regard to the specific issue of the 
provision of counsel, both from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and within 
jurisdictions.76
Again, these findings take on even more importance when considered 
in the context of the findings by the MacArthur Research Network77 that 
mental patients are not always incompetent to make rational decisions 
Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 678–79 (1987); see 
also, Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 
76 WASH. L. REV. 67 (2001). 
 72. This is not to suggest that the existence of a constitutional right is somehow 
illegitimate if it is not honored in each individual case seeking to vindicate it.  Rather, 
“honored” here refers to the presence of a legally legitimate hearing at which a decision 
as to whether to honor the right is fairly assessed. 
 73. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: 
Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 443 (1992); see 
Perlin, supra note 50, at 415 (discussing Tyler’s insights in this context). 
 74. Steven K. Hoge & Thomas C. Feucht-Haviar, Long-Term, Assenting Psychiatric 
Patients: Decisional Capacity and the Quality of Care, 23 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & 
L. 343, 349 (1995) (“[O]ur findings seem to undermine physicians’ arguments that 
informed consent is an unnecessary intrusion into the doctor-patient relationship, which 
interferes with the provision of effective treatment.”); see also Bruce J. Winick, Competency 
to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 HOUS. L. 
REV. 15, 46–47 (1991) (discussing the therapeutic value of patient choice); Julie Magno 
Zito et al., The Treatment Review Panel: A Solution to Treatment Refusal?, 12 BULL. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 349, 357 (1984). 
 75. Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 56, at 120 (quoting Perlin, supra note 14, at 49). 
 76. See generally Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 56, at 122–24. 
 77. See 2 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 3B-14.5, at 373–74. 
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and are not inherently more incompetent than nonmentally ill medical 
patients.78  Yet, what Professor Winick refers to as “19th-century notions 
equating mental illness with incompetence,”79 still, in practice, “continue 
to influence legal rules and practices in this area.”80
If judges uncritically conflate institutionalization with incompetency, 
lack of meaningful counsel—to structure statutory, caselaw-based, and 
empirical arguments—may be fatal to the patient’s case.81  The mere 
existence of counsel on behalf of institutionalized mental patients is 
often invisible to trial courts;82 certainly, there is no reason for optimism 
about judicial knowledge or interest in this area of the law, absent 
aggressive, advocacy-focused counsel. 
If ward psychiatrists demonstrate a propensity to categorize “incompetent” 
as an equivalent of “makes bad decisions” and assume, in the face of 
conflicting statutory and case law, that incompetence in decisionmaking 
can be presumed from the fact of institutionalization,83 then lack of 
counsel—to inquire into the bases of these views on cross-examination 
and to demonstrate to the court that they are dissonant with established 
case and statutory law—may similarly make the legal process an illusory 
safeguard. 
In spite of the impressive body of caselaw outlined above, the 
existence of a right to refuse treatment remains enigmatic—at best—for 
many clinicians.84  Some are resistant, arguing—unsuccessfully in court, 
 78. See generally Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment 
Competence Study. III: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical 
Treatments, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (1995). 
 79. Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: Legal and 
Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 137, 153 (1996). 
 80. Id. (for an explanation of these “19th-century notions,” see id. at 151). 
 81. On counsel’s educative role, see 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 2B-9, at 247; 
Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Individuals 
in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 168–73 (Summer 1982). 
 82. See, e.g., In re Judicial Commitment of C.P.K., 516 So. 2d 1323, 1325 (La. Ct. 
App. 1987), discussed supra note 61. 
 83. See, e.g., Brian Ladds et al., The Disposition of Criminal Charges After 
Involuntary Medication to Restore Competency to Stand Trial, 38 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1442 
(1993); Brian Ladds et al., Involuntary Medication of Patients Who Are Incompetent to 
Stand Trial: A Descriptive Study of the New York Experience with Judicial Review, 21 
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 529 (1993). 
 84. I have been presenting papers on this topic to mental health professionals for 
the better part of thirty years.  Consistently, there are always questions from the audience 
expressing surprise that there is such a right, and often expressing the view that such a 
right is clinically unwarranted.  For the Supreme Court’s most recent foray into this area 
of the law, see Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), in which the court established 




but, perhaps, more successfully in clinical practice—that the existence of 
the right is destructive; certainly the provocative titles of early articles 
written by prominent forensic psychiatrists about the right to refuse 
treatment suggest a basic tension that may not be resolvable absent 
sensitive articulation of the underlying legal concepts.85
IV.  THE NEED FOR ORGANIZED COUNSEL 
It is my conclusion that organized and regularized counsel is essential 
if there is to be adequate counsel in individual right to refuse treatment 
cases.  Without such counsel, the meaningful implementation of rulings in 
class action/law reform cases and/or appellate decisions will be virtually 
impossible. 
First, there is no evidence that occasional counsel has any concept of 
the complexity of the legal issues, the conflicts in medical research, the 
skills needed for effective cross-examination, or the potential range of 
available less restrictive alternatives that can be suggested to the court.  
The little literature that is available reflects the lack of competence on 
the part of counsel generally assigned to do such cases. 
Eight years ago, Deborah Dorfman and I studied the right to refuse 
process in Utah, California, and Washington.  We concluded that the 
litigation of individual right to refuse cases offered “no coherent 
framework” for policymakers seeking to create a global structure for 
such hearings.86  We further noted the significant disparity in the way 
right to refuse cases were litigated and decided, both inter-jurisdictionally 
and intra-jurisdictionally,87 finding that, in many counties, such 
hearings were nothing more than an “empty shell (offering only an 
illusion of due process).”88  I have found nothing in the literature to 
suggest that there has been any significant improvement in the past 
eight years. 
Perhaps the best and most important study that has been done on this 
issue has been the research reported by Professor Grant Morris on his 
experience as a California hearing officer whose role was to determine 
procedures for use in cases of persons incompetent to stand trial who wish to refuse the 
administration of antipsychotic medication. 
 85. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, “Rotting With Their Rights 
On”: Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306 (1979); Darold A. Treffert, Dying with Their 
Rights On, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1041 (1973); Steven Rachlin, One Right Too Many, 3 
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 99 (1975). 
 86.  Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 56, at 124. 
 87.  Id. at 124–29. 
 88.  Id. at 130; see also Sana Loue, The Involuntary Civil Commitment of Mentally 
Ill Persons in the United States and Romania: A Comparative Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL 
MED. 211, 235 n.120 (2002) (same). 
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patients’ competence to refuse medication.89  Professor Morris’s study 
tells us that, often, hospital doctors failed to tell patients the risks and 
benefits of the medications that were prescribed for them;90 yet, this 
failure to inform—a necessary predicate, it seems to me, of “informed 
consent” under any definition of that term—was virtually never 
challenged by patients’ counsel.91  In other cases, patients might have 
had rational reasons to refuse, such as their familiarity with side-effects 
from past experiences with the drug in question,92 but if the rationality 
of this request were not stressed by counsel (either on direct 
examination, cross-examination, or summation), then the hearing would, 
in fact, be the exact sort of “empty shell” that Dorfman and I described. 
Without such counsel, it is likely that there will be no meaningful 
counterbalance to the hospital’s “script,” and the patient’s articulated 
constitutional rights will evaporate.  A recent piece by Professor 
Wenona Whitfield looked at Illinois practice in this area, and concluded 
that the attorneys assigned to do these cases—on behalf of both the 
hospital and the patient—“have little incentive or interest in making this 
area of the law their specialty.”93  And, few judges have the depth or 
breadth of knowledge (or, frankly, the interest) to “save” the ineffective 
 89.  Grant H. Morris, Judging Judgment: Assessing the Competence of Mental 
Patients to Refuse Treatment, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 364 (1995).  These hearings 
were held in partial implementation of the California decision in Riese v. St. Mary’s 
Hospital & Medical Center, 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 211 (Ct. App. 1987); see generally 2 
PERLIN, supra note 1, § 3B-7.2c, at 276–79. 
 90.  Morris, supra note 89, at 388. 
 91.  Id. at 425–30. 
 92.  The Supreme Court has explicitly linked the possibility of side effects to the 
rationale for Constitutional due process protections in right to refuse cases.  See 
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229–30 (1990) (“[I]t is also true that the drugs can 
have serious, even fatal, side effects . . . tardive dyskinesia, perhaps the most discussed 
side effect of antipsychotic drugs . . . [is] irreversible in some cases, [and is] 
characterized by involuntary, uncontrollable movements of various muscles, especially 
around the face.”); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137 (1992) (“[It was] suggested 
that the dosage administered to [the defendant] was within the toxic range, and could 
make him ‘uptight’ [or make him] suffer from drowsiness or confusion. . . .  It is clearly 
possible that such side effects had an impact upon not just [defendants’] outward 
appearance, but also the content of his testimony . . . , his ability to follow the proceedings, or 
the substance of his communication with counsel.” (internal citations omitted)); Sell v. 
United States, 539 U.S. 166, 185 (2003) (“Whether a particular drug will tend to sedate a 
defendant, interfere with communication with counsel, prevent rapid reaction to trial 
developments, or diminish the ability to express emotions are matters important in 
determining the permissibility of medication to restore competence . . . .”). 
 93.  Wenona Y. Whitfield, Capacity, Competency, and Courts: The Illinois 
Experience, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 385, 404–05 (2004). 




counsel. Whitfield notes that, similarly, the assigned judges “generally 
have little judicial experience and little incentive to develop expertise in 
this area.”94
But this issue has largely been the subject of a stunning lack of 
commentary in the law journals.  In the introduction to the symposium in 
which Dorfman and I published our paper, Professor Bruce Winick 
referred to this stage as a “critical and almost entirely unexamined aspect 
of the competency determination process.”95  Again, eight years later, it 
remains unexamined. 
V.  SANISM, PRETEXTUALITY, AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
The failure to assign adequate counsel bespeaks sanism and pretextuality, 
and a failure to consider the implications of therapeutic jurisprudence.  
Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of 
other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing 
social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.  It 
infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices.  Sanism is 
largely invisible and largely socially acceptable.  It is based predominantly 
upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization, and is 
sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged “ordinary common 
sense” (OCS)96 and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to 
events both in everyday life and in the legal process.97
Pretextuality defines the ways in which courts accept (either implicitly 
or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest 
(and frequently meretricious) decisionmaking, specifically where witnesses, 
especially expert witnesses, show a high propensity to purposely distort 
their testimony in order to achieve desired ends.  This pretextuality is 
poisonous; it infects all participants in the judicial system, breeds 
cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and reinforces 
shoddy lawyering, blasé judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt 
 94.  Id. at 404. 
 95.  Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: A Summary of the MacArthur Treatment 
Competence Study and an Introduction to the Special Theme, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & 
L. 3, 15 (1996). 
 96.  OCS is a “powerful unconscious animator of legal decision making.”  Michael 
L. Perlin, “She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl”: Neonaticide, The Insanity Defense, and 
the Irrelevance of “Ordinary Common Sense”, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 25 
(2003); see Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields 
in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 737 (1986–1987) (stating that OCS 
exemplified by the attitude of “What I know is ‘self evident’; it is ‘what everybody 
knows’”). 
 97.  Perlin, supra note 96, at 24–25 (citing Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked 
Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability 
Law Developed as it Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 4–5 (1999)). 
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testifying.98  All aspects of mental disability law are pervaded by sanism 
and by pretextuality, whether the specific presenting topic is involuntary 
civil commitment law, right to refuse treatment law, the sexual rights of 
persons with mental disabilities, or any aspect of the criminal trial 
process.99
Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model by which we can 
assess the ultimate impact of case law and legislation that affects 
mentally disabled individuals, studying the role of the law as a 
therapeutic agent, recognizing that substantive rules, legal procedures, and 
lawyers’ roles may have either therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences, 
and questioning whether such rules, procedures, and roles can or 
should be reshaped so as to enhance their therapeutic potential, while 
not subordinating due process principles.100
I have suggested elsewhere that therapeutic jurisprudence should be 
employed to “expose pretextuality and strip bare the law’s sanist facade” 
and to be used as a “powerful tool that will serve as ‘a means of 
attacking and uprooting the “we/they distinction that has traditionally 
plagued and stigmatized the mentally disabled.”’”101  How, then, do 
these concepts “fit” in the analysis I have undertaken in this Paper? 
Recently, I have written critically of the way that lawyers—even 
lawyers who identify themselves as public interest lawyers—are often 
sanist.  I have argued: 
   Sanism permeates the legal representation process both in cases in which 
mental capacity is a central issue, and those in which such capacity is a 
collateral question. Sanist lawyers (1) distrust their mentally disabled clients, (2) 
trivialize their complaints, (3) fail to forge authentic attorney-client relationships 
with such clients and reject their clients’ potential contributions to case-strategizing, 
and (4) take less seriously case outcomes that are adverse to their clients.102
Sanist lawyers cannot be relied upon to provide adequate representation to 
their clients in right to refuse treatment cases. 
Judicial complicity in the assignment and performance of inadequate 
counsel evidences sanism.  Again, the fact that, in the two and a half 
years since K.G.F. was decided, not another state has endorsed the 
 98.  Perlin, supra note 96, at 25. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA 
on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. 
REV. 193, 228 (2000). 
 101.  Perlin, supra note 47, at 544; PERLIN, supra note 13, at 301. 
 102.  Perlin, supra note 17, at 695. 




Montana Supreme Court’s “take” on sanism is stark evidence of the fact 
that this issue is simply “off the docket” for the judicial system.103  
Passive sanism remains sanism. 
I have often recounted the most chilling sanist comment that I have 
ever heard from a sitting trial judge: 
   [No example of judicial hostility] is perhaps as chilling as the following story: 
Sometime after the trial court’s decision in Rennie [v. Klein],104 I had occasion 
to speak to a state court trial judge about the Rennie case.  He asked me, 
“Michael, do you know what I would have done had you brought Rennie before 
me?”  (The Rennie case was litigated by counsel in the N.J. Division of Mental 
Health Advocacy; I was director of the Division at that time).  I replied, “No,” 
and he then answered, “I’d’ve taken the son-of-a-bitch behind the courthouse 
and had him shot.”105
It is probably no coincidence that the focal point of this conversation 
was a right to refuse treatment case. 
When Dorfman and I did our initial survey about counsel in right to 
refuse cases, we stressed the pretextual nature of the enterprise: 
The common wisdom is clear here.  Drugs serve two major purposes of social 
control: They “cure” dangerousness, and they are the only assurance that 
deinstitutionalized patients can remain free in community settings.  Both of 
these assumptions are reflected in the case law that has developed in individual 
involuntary civil commitment cases (in which a judge’s perception of the 
likelihood that an individual self-medicates becomes the critical variable in case 
dispositions); they are also reflected in the public discourse that is heard in 
classrooms, hospital corridors, and courtrooms. 
   Neither of these assumptions has any basis in science or in law.  Yet, without 
counsel to serve as a brake—to ask questions, to challenge assumptions, to 
identify false ordinary common sense, to point out the dangerous pitfalls of 
heuristic thinking—these assumptions will continue to dominate and control the 
disposition of individual right to refuse treatment cases . . . .106
Again, I have seen no evidence that there has been any change in these 
attitudes in the eight years since we reported our findings. 
In his comprehensive and masterful book, The Right to Refuse Mental 
Health Treatment, Professor Bruce Winick discussed some of the ways 
that the implementation of such a right might advance therapeutic 
jurisprudence ends: such implementation could involve patient involvement 
in the design of her treatment program,107 make it more likely that 
 103.  See text accompanying note 46 (discussing In re Detention of T.A. H.-L., 97 
P.3d 767 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)). 
 104.  462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (granting involuntarily committed mental 
patients a limited right to refuse medication). 
 105.  See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 97, at 16 n.70. 
 106.  Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 56, at 135 (internal citations omitted). 
 107.  BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 84, 
328–29 (1997). 
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treatment goals actually be articulated and set,108 better ensure that 
informed consent was authentically honored,109 and more likely lead to 
more ethical practices.110  Similarly, in another law review article that I 
wrote with Keri Gould and Dorfman, I argued that the right to refuse 
treatment served the therapeutic jurisprudence value of “fairness”: 
The perception of receiving a fair hearing is therapeutic because it contributes to 
the individual’s sense of dignity and conveys that he or she is being taken 
seriously. Other studies show that medication judicial-administrative proceedings can 
be therapeutic because they allow patients the opportunity to discuss thoroughly 
the medications and their benefits and risks with their doctors.  By holding 
medication hearings, doctors must again discuss the medications, their purpose, 
and potential side effects.  At the same time, patients have the opportunity to 
explain the reasons they do not want the medication and ask questions about the 
drugs.  This may be therapeutic because the patients’ medication concerns can 
be better considered in making medication determinations, thus enhancing the 
efficacy of medication decisions.  This benefit is particularly important at large 
public hospitals where doctors, because of large caseloads, often have less time 
to spend with their patients on a day-to-day basis.111
The research reported on by, variously, Ensminger and Liguori,112 
Dorfman and myself,113 Gould, Dorfman, and myself,114 Whitfield,115 and 
Tyler116—when read together—tells us that (1) counsel has an important 
role in effectuating such aims and ensuring dignity117 in the entire mental 
disability law process, and (2) counsel has—globally—failed miserably 
in bringing about these ends in the right to refuse medication arena.  An 
infusion of trained, focused counsel would prove to be a therapeutic 
jurisprudence elixir. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
What, then, are my recommendations?  Here are a few: 
1.  Each state should adopt procedures that guarantee the appointment 
 108.  Id. at 330–32. 
 109.  Id. at 341. 
 110.  Id. at 400–02. 
 111.  Perlin et al., supra note 52, at 114. 
 112.  Ensminger & Liguori, supra note 49. 
 113.  Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 56. 
 114.  Perlin et al., supra note 52. 
 115.  Whitfield, supra note 93. 
 116.  Tyler, supra note 73. 
 117.  I discuss the significance of dignity values in this context in Michael L. Perlin, 
“Dignity was the First to Leave”: Godinez v. Moran, Colin Ferguson, and the Trial of 
Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 61 (1996). 




of effective, trained counsel to represent patients at both involuntary 
civil commitment hearings and at right to refuse treatment hearings. 
2.  State attorneys general and county counsels should insist that 
lawyers representing hospitals in such cases be equally effective and 
trained.118 
3.  Judicial educational agencies such as the National Judicial College 
should offer regular courses in all aspects of the right to refuse treatment 
for state court judges.119
4.  All participants in the system should acknowledge the ways in 
which sanism and pretextuality corrupt the judicial process (especially 
this aspect of the judicial process), confront that corruption, and take 
seriously the significance of that corruption.120
5.  A therapeutic jurisprudence lens should regularly be applied to this 
entire area of the law, and courts should begin to consider the issues 
discussed here through a therapeutic jurisprudence filter. 
6.  Scholars should seriously consider adding this issue to their 
research agendas.  I have but scratched the surface of the problem in this 
Paper, and there is far more to be done. 
Recall the title of this Paper.  (Just Like) Tom Thumb’s Blues is a 
difficult song to deconstruct (I have been working on it more or less 
fruitlessly for forty years), but the verse that I draw upon for my title 
seems to be a perfect fit here.  Recall now my reference to Professor 
Morris’s paper in which he chides counsel for not challenging hospital 
doctors for their failure to explain much about the medication process to 
their patients.  If the doctor will not explain to the patient “what it is 
[he’s] got,” then that doctor is certainly not the patient’s “best friend.”  
But this failure is compounded by lawyer apathy.  In the last line of the 
 118.  For one of the rare considerations of the role of the prosecuting/hospital 
attorney in civil commitment cases, see David B. Wexler, Inappropriate Patient 
Confinement and Appropriate State Advocacy, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra 
note 49, at 347.  See also supra text accompanying note 95 (reporting on the “little 
incentive or interest” on the part of Illinois state attorneys in the representation of the 
state in such cases); Whitfield, supra note 93, at 404–05. 
 119.  It is not enough that lawyers and judges learn about mental illness, diagnoses, 
etc.; it is essential that they learn also about attitudes.  See supra note 59, at 15 
(discussing Poythress).  Poythress concluded that the “trained” lawyers’ behavior in 
court was not materially different from that of “untrained” lawyers because the former 
group’s attitudes toward their clients had not changed.  Mere knowledge of cross-
examination methods, he noted, “did not deter them from taking [the] more traditional, 
passive, paternal stance toward the proposed patients.”  As one trainee noted: “I really 
enjoyed your workshop and I’ve been reading over your materials and its [sic] all very 
interesting, but this is the real world, and we’ve got to do something with these people.  
They’re sick.” 
 120.  See Falter v. Veterans’ Admin., 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1185 (D.N.J. 1980) 
(stating that the central inquiry is “how [persons with mental disabilities] are treated as 
human beings”).  I discuss Falter in this context in Perlin, supra note 47, at 541 n.49. 
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song, Dylan sings, “I’m going back to New York City/I do believe I’ve 
had enough.”  In a few hours, I will be going back to New York City, 
and when it comes back to the behavior of lawyers in this area of the 
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